

Statement by Amb. J. Enkhsaikhan of Mongolia on implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and Security Council resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran

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My delegation would like to thank the Director General for his report regarding the implementation of NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of UNSC resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran. I would also like to thank the Secretariat for organizing a technical briefing on the item on 24 February, which my delegation found very informative and useful.

We note from the report that though the Agency has continued to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material, there has not been much movement on the remaining issues of concern. The Director General's report as well as the delegates that have spoken before me dwelt in detail both on the progress and lack of it, on the current enrichment related activities at Natanz, on the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant, the reporting activities, the heavy water related projects, other implementation issues, possible military dimensions, etc. This mixed picture has been well recorded yet once again during this morning's and afternoon's consideration of the item. I see no need to dwell on the particulars of the issue at this stage.

The report shows that Iran has continued its enrichment activities and, despite United Nations Security Council resolutions, proceeded to increase the enrichment level of uranium at its Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant (PFEP) up to 19.8% U-235. This cannot be considered as a confidence-building measure. With many issues unresolved, it only raises further suspicion. In my delegation's view the issue regarding the modified Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Agreements General Part could be a litmus test for confidence-building. Therefore Mongolia calls upon Iran to reconsider its decision to suspend the implementation of the modified code, as requested by the Board of Governors in October 2007 and 2008 respectively.

The report sums up the implementation of the safeguards agreement and relevant provision of the Security Council resolutions as follows: While the Agency continues to verify the non-diversion of the declared nuclear material, Iran has not provided the necessary cooperation to permit the Agency to confirm that all nuclear material is in peaceful activities. Nor is it implementing the requirements contained in the relevant documents of the Board of Governors and resolutions of the Security Council, including implementation of the Additional Protocol. On the other hand, they are essential for building confidence in the exclusively peaceful purpose of its nuclear programme and for resolving the outstanding issues reflected in the Director General's report. The report points out the issues which need to be addressed to

build confidence. Therefore I agree with the statement by the Governor of India that the door needs to be kept open for dialogue and cooperation.

Mongolia has always supported international efforts to resolve this issue on the basis of good will and cooperation. In this context, it welcomed the October 1 meeting and understandings arrived at in Geneva. Like others, it also welcomed the Director General's efforts to address the issue of refueling the Tehran Research Reactor as an important confidence-building measure. It believes that not escalation of rhetoric or mutual recriminations but rather cooperation in addressing the issues involved, including of providing the necessary medical isotopes would be the practical steps in resolving these issues. In this regard I agree with the Governor of India that the door needs to be kept open for dialogue and cooperation.

Finally, my delegation joins those that call upon Iran to cooperate fully with the Agency so as to provide it with credible assurance regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities and thus bring to a conclusion this long-overdue issue and move on to addressing the issues of broader medical and other peaceful uses of nuclear energy.